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Limits to Dependability Assurance
- A Controversy Revisited
(Or: A Question of ‘Conﬁdence’)
Bev Littlewood
Centre for Software Reliability, City University, London
b.littlewood@csr.city.ac.uk
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Background, a little history of a couple
of technical controversies…
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Do you remember 10-9 and all that?
Twenty years ago: much controversy about apparent need for 10-9
probability of failure per hour for ﬂight control software
– Could it be achieved? Could such a claim be justiﬁed?
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Or UK Sizewell B nuclear plant?
Protection system required
10-7 probability of failure on
demand
• Diversity: software-based
primary system (PPS),
hardwired secondary system
(SPS)
• Controversy centred on PPS:
how good was it?
– initially required 10-4 for PPS,
10-3 for SPS
– eventually claimed 10-3 for
PPS, 10-4 for SPS
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How did these turn out?
• Sizewell B licensed for operation, no software failures have
been reported in operation
– licensing was very costly, in spite of modest goal
• A320 family very successful, and eventually has demonstrated a
low accident rate
– several accidents in early service
– Airbus claim none of these attributable directly to software
• There are interesting statistics on accident rates of current
generation of ‘computerised’ aircraft
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Source: “Statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents”, Boeing Commercial Airplanes
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Source: “Statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents”, Boeing Commercial Airplanes
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What does this tell us?
• Highly computerised current generation of aircraft seem safer
than previous generations
– Those types having large ﬂeets seem very safe
• But there are signiﬁcant differences between aircraft types
– E.g. B737 family seems better than A320 family
– E.g. B777 record is very good
• Early life losses - from some of the aircraft types - contribute
disproportionately to the accident rates
• But this is after-the-fact judgment: could it have been predicted
before operation?
• In particular, could the contribution of computer-based systems
have been predicted?
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The nature of the problem
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Why can’t software be fault-free?
Difﬁculty, complexity, novel functionality…. all militate against
perfection: software will contain faults
What are achieved fault densities?
• Even for safety-critical industries, 1 fault per kLoC is regarded
as ﬁrst class
– e.g. study of C130J software by UK MoD estimated 1.4 safety-critical
faults per kLoC (23 per kLoC for non-critical)
• For commercial software, studies show around 30 faults per
kLoC
– Windows XP has 35 MLoC, so >1 million faults?!
• But this does not necessarily mean software must be
unreliable…
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Many faults = very unreliable?
Not necessarily!
• Microsoft Windows reliability has grown from 300 hours
MTBF (with 95/98) to about 3000 hours despite increased size
and complexity (i.e. more faults)
• After-the-fact estimation of failure rates, based on extensive
operational experience with software in aircraft and
automobiles suggest very high reliabilities can be achieved
– Automobiles: Ellims has estimated that no more than 5 deaths per year
(and about 300 injuries) caused by software in the UK - suggests about
0.2 x 10-6 death/injury failures per hour. Even better per system - say 10-7
– Aircraft: very few accidents have been attributed to software; Shooman
claims, again, about 10-7 per hour per system
– But these are after-the-fact ﬁgures
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Why can software be so reliable…
…when it contains thousands of faults?
• Because many (most?) faults are ‘very small’
– i.e. they occur extremely infrequently during operation
• Adams - more than twenty years ago - examined occurrence
rates of faults on large IBM system software: found that more
than 60% were ‘5000-year’ bugs
– i.e. each such bug only showed itself, on average, every 5000 years
(across a world-wide population of many users)
– ﬁgures based on reported bugs - may be even more dramatic if
unreported ones could be included?
– so the systems he studied had many thousands of these faults, but were
acceptably reliable in operation
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So what’s the problem?
• Just because large complex programs can be very reliable, it
does not mean you can assume that a particular one will be
– even if you have successfully produced reliable software in the past, you
can’t assume from this that a new program will be reliable
–  even if some software engineering processes have been successful in the
past, this does not guarantee they will produce reliable software next time
• So you need to measure how reliable your software actually is
• And this assessment needs to be carried out before extensive
real-life operational use
– how else can you make a risk assessment?
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So what’s the problem?
We need to be able to tell, before extensive operational experience
is available, that a system is good enough
• E.g for critical aircraft systems, 10-9 probability of failure per
hour
– This is not as silly as it seems: if we want 10-7 for the whole aircraft - and
this is being achieved - and there are ~100 such systems per aircraft, then
that is ~10-9 per system
• This is extremely difﬁcult to achieve, it seems even harder -
some would say impossible - to assure
• Even for the Sizewell PPS - with a very modest dependability
goal - it proved very difﬁcult to convince the regulator the goal
had been achieved
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Sizewell PPS safety arguments
• Mainly centred on the software
• Needed 10-4 pfd
• Safety case used evidence about quality of production, different
kinds of assessment of built product (testing, extensive static
analysis), etc
• This involved extensive expert judgment
• Regulators were not sufﬁciently conﬁdent in the 10-4 claim, but
were prepared to accept 10-3
• Eventually licensed for operation when the secondary system
was judged to be an order of magnitude better than had been
thought
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This process prompted some questions
• How conﬁdent was regulator in original 10-4?
• How conﬁdent was he in eventually-accepted 10-3?
• How conﬁdent did he need to be?
• If his conﬁdence in 10-3 is sufﬁciently high to be ‘acceptable’,
how is this number used?
– What happens to the residual uncertainty? (if he’s 90% conﬁdent, what
about the other 10%?)
• In fact there seemed to be an informal reasoning along the
following lines: “we have some conﬁdence - but not enough - in
10-4, so let’s only claim 10-3 and treat this as if it were true”
– See our paper at DSN (Edinburgh, June 2007), for a way that such
reasoning could be formalised
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Don’t get me wrong…
…the regulators here were very good: honest and extremely
competent
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What do standards say?
• How conﬁdent in 10-9 have regulators been, when they have
certiﬁed ﬂight critical avionics?
– What conﬁdence does adherence to Do178B give us?
– Nothing in the standard tells us (in fact it tells us nothing about the claim,
let alone the conﬁdence…)
• What is relationship between claim and conﬁdence in, e.g., the
SILs of IEC 61508?
– You tell me…!
• Some standards informally acknowledge the problem
– E.g. UK Def Stan 00-56 suggests use of a ‘diverse two-legged argument’
to increase conﬁdence in a dependability claim
– But it contains no guidance on issues concerning ‘how much’
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A simplistic illustration
Consider the case of operational testing of software. It is easy to
show that if you have seen 4602 failure-free demands, you can
claim that the pfd is smaller than 10-3 with 99% conﬁdence.
• With the same evidence you could also claim 0.5*10-3 with 90%
conﬁdence, 0.15*10-3 with 50% conﬁdence, and so on
• In fact there are an inﬁnite number of (p, α) pairs for each set of
evidence
• For any claim, p, you can always support it at some level of
conﬁdence
– But would you be happy to ﬂy in a plane when the regulator has said he
is 0.1% conﬁdent that the ﬂight control software has achieved the
required 10-9?
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There are two sources of uncertainty…
• There is uncertainty about when a software-based system will
fail
– In the jargon: ‘aleatory uncertainty’
– It is now widely accepted that this uncertainty should be expressed
probabilistically as a dependability claim (e.g. failure rate, pfd, etc)
• There is uncertainty about the reasoning used to support a
dependability claim
– In the jargon: ‘epistemic uncertainty’
– In  particular, the role of expert judgment
– The appropriate calculus here is Bayesian (subjective) probability
• This second type is largely ignored, or treated very informally
– Particularly in our community (computer science, software engineering..)
– Although there is a nuclear literature on the problem
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Conﬁdence-based dependability cases
If claims for dependability can never be made with certainty, we
need a formalism that handles the uncertainty
• Informally, a dependability case is some reasoning, based on
assumptions and evidence, that supports a dependability claim
at a particular level of conﬁdence
– Sometimes convenient to deal with ‘Doubt’ = 1 - ‘Conﬁdence’
• For a particular claim (e.g. the probability of failure on demand
of this system is better than 10-3), your conﬁdence in the truth of
the claim depends on:
– strength/weakness of evidence (e.g. the extensiveness of the testing)
– conﬁdence/doubt in truth of assumptions
– correctness of reasoning
• Conjecture: assumption doubt is a harder problem to handle
than evidence weakness
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An example
The following example from our recent work illustrates how
conﬁdence can treated formally as part of a dependability case
• And how there can be unexpected pitfalls
• For details, see our paper in May 2007 issue of IEEE Trans
Software Engineering
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Dependability case ‘fault tolerance’
Can we borrow ideas from system fault tolerance? ‘Argument
diversity’ as analogy of ‘system diversity’?
Assumption A
Evidence A
Reliability
Claim
Evidence B
Assumption B
• Multi-legged arguments to
increase conﬁdence in
reliability claim(s)
– leg B could overcome evidence
weakness and/or assumption
doubt in leg A
– legs need to be diverse
– advocated in some existing
standards (but only informal
justiﬁcation)
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Motivation: analogy from systems
• the use of diverse redundancy to mask failure is ubiquitous
– ‘two heads are better than one’, ‘belt and braces’, ‘don’t put all your eggs
in ne basket’
– e.g. scientiﬁc peer review; e.g. multiple medical diagnoses
• commonly used for systems
– e.g. design-diverse critical software in Airbus aircraft
• often used in software development processes
– e.g. diverse procedures to ﬁnd software faults
• reasonably good understanding of these applications of diversity
– e.g. formal probability models
• do these ideas work for dependability cases?
ICSE2007 keynote, Minneapolis, May 2007 - slide 25
Do multi-legged arguments increase
conﬁdence? If so, how much?
We have examined a simple idealised example in some detail.
• motivated by (relatively) simple software for a protection system
• two argument legs
– testing
– veriﬁcation
• dependability claim is ‘pfd is smaller than 10-3’
Our approach uses BBN models of the arguments, which are
manipulated analytically via parameters that determine their node
probability tables (compared with more usual purely numeric
approach to BBNs)
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2-legged BBN topology
S: system’s true unknown pfd, 0≤S≤1
Z: system speciﬁcation, {correct,
incorrect}
O: testing oracle, {correct, not correct}
V: veriﬁcation outcome, {veriﬁed, not
veriﬁed}
T: test result, {no failures, failures}
C: ﬁnal claim, {accepted, not accepted}
(V,T) represents what we have called
‘evidence’. We shall only consider the
‘perfect outcome’ situation here: T=no
failures, V=veriﬁed
ICSE2007 keynote, Minneapolis, May 2007 - slide 27
Single leg topologies
             Testing leg Veriﬁcation leg
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Computations with this BBN
We are interested in how good 2-legged arguments are -  for
example, in how much the 2-legged argument improves on the
single arguments
• E.g. could evaluate conﬁdence in claim, P(S≤10-3 | VT), and
compare with P(S≤10-3 | T) and P(S≤10-3 | V)
– how much better is 2-legged argument than each of the single-legged
arguments?
• E.g. we could evaluate P(CS | evidence)=P(CS | VT)
– in particular P(C=accepted, S>10-3 | evidence), concerning unsafe failure
of an argument
These involve elicitation of complex prior beliefs (to ﬁll in the
node probability tables of the BBNs)
• This involves extensive expert judgment - as is usual with
software-based systems
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The model is complex…
…in spite of its idealisation. So we make simplifying assumptions
(our aim is to be conservative). We can then manipulate the
resulting mathematics, e.g. doubt about pfd claim is
• (I’m not going to talk about details of the maths!)
• parameters here capture different aspects of prior belief
• advantage over purely numerical approach to BBNs is that we
know what the parameters mean
• and you can do ‘what if’ calculations using MathCad,
Mathematica, Maple etc
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Surprise 1
Evidence that is supportive (i.e. ‘clearly’ good news) can decrease
conﬁdence, even in a single argument leg!
• Example: Testing leg. We have a set of parameters (i.e. beliefs)
for which seeing very many failure-free test cases (>17,000)
decreases conﬁdence from a priori value of 0.99583 to 0.66803
• Seems counter-intuitive, but is it? Key role is played by
‘assumption doubt’, and how this changes as we see evidence
(here lots of failure-free operation)
• This centres on the matrix, P(Z, O):
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Surprise 1 (contd.)
The assumption doubt changes as follows:
• Informally: seeing no failures could be evidence for small pfd,  or for
defective oracle
- reasonable that Z, O, S prior beliefs are positively associated
- so increased doubt about oracle, as here, can imply increased doubt about S
• We call arguments like this, that reduce conﬁdence, ‘non-supportive’
- what is surprising is that they can be based on supportive evidence
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Surprise 2 (the big one!)
• What happens with 2-legged arguments?
• If you add a supportive argument to an existing argument does
your conﬁdence increase?
• Sometimes not!
• This arises, again, from a subtle ‘backstairs’ inferential chain of
reasoning
– See our paper for an after-the-fact intuitive explanation
– But note that this was not obvious before we did the detailed formal
analysis - it surprised us!!
• Notice how all this contrasts with systems, where a 1-out-of-2
system is always better than each single channel
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Discussion
What does all this mean?
• could we expect these counter-intuitive results to occur in
practice?
– not sure, but difﬁcult to justify ruling this out
– do the results arise from our model simpliﬁcations?
+ we think not, but cannot be sure
• on the other hand, we have seen plausible beliefs for our model
which do not result in these counter-intuitive results
– e.g. get respectable increase in conﬁdence from adding a second
argument leg
– argument diversity (sometimes) works
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Discussion (2)
• At least, there is a possibility for subtle interactions between
beliefs/assumptions/conﬁdence when dealing with disparate
evidence in dependability cases
– naïve purely-numeric BBN results need to be treated with suspicion
– human judgment, unaided by a formalism, even more so?
• We have demonstrated the feasibility of a formal analysis of
these kinds of dependability cases in terms of claim-conﬁdence
– can show consequences of a priori beliefs to experts
– give feed-back
• However, it gets very hard to do this for realistic arguments
– we have some ideas about how to relax some of our simpliﬁcations
• There are some difﬁcult issues concerning elicitation of belief
from experts in practice
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So where does all this leave us?
In this talk I wanted to make two main points:
• There is a need for quantitative dependability cases, based on a
formal calculus of conﬁdence
• This can be provided via formal (Bayesian) probabilistic
modelling
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On the need for a theory of conﬁdence
• Some years ago, a regulator told me: “Yes, I do believe the
A320’s ﬂight control system is a 10-9 system”
• I’ve seen a railway signalling system where the apparent
requirement is a failure rate no bigger than 10-12 per hour!
• I believe that conﬁdence in such claims, based on rigorous
arguments, would be very low
– Responsibility lies with the builders of such systems to demonstrate high
conﬁdence in such a way that this can be agreed by third parties
– And if this can’t be done for a safety-critical system, should it be allowed
to be deployed?
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On the need….(2)
But it’s not all gloom
• Even for critical systems, ultra-high reliability ﬁgures are rare
– E.g. the Sizewell PPS ﬁgure is quite modest: it should be possible to
obtain high conﬁdence in such a ﬁgure
• These comments do not only apply to critical systems: for other
systems, a conﬁdence-based approach would be valuable
– E.g. the need for banks to assess IT risks under the Basel II accords
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The Bayesian approach needs more work
For example, we need a much more holistic approach
• Beyond ‘software and computers’
– it’s very rare for systems to be purely ‘technical’ - there are almost
always humans and organisations involved, and the whole system needs
to be addressed
– interactions here can be complex and counter-intuitive
– require collaboration with psychologists, sociologists, etc
• Beyond ‘reliability and safety’, to incorporate security
– very little work has been done on problem of (probabilistic) security
assessment
– but some of the reliability techniques probably apply
– need to be able to understand trade-offs
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But (and ﬁnally) beware simple panaceas
• There are deep subtleties in the relationships between the
constituents of dependability arguments (assumptions, evidence,
reasoning, claims, conﬁdence)
– These seem to be inherent - you can’t wish them away
– You ignore them at your peril
• Unaided expert judgment could get things badly wrong
– Even BBNs, when these are simply numeric, can be very misleading and
lead to misplaced trust
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Thank you for listening!
(I’m assuming at the time of writing that
you will have been!)
Questions?
Brickbats?
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